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Abstract
Recent evidence suggests the connection between quality improvement and financial results may
be weak. Consider the case of Analog Devices, Inc., a leading manufacturer of integrated cir-
cuits. Analog's TQM program included top management commitment and excellent training.
Analog introduced a "Balanced Scorecard" emphasizing nonfinancial measures such as delivery
performance, cycle time, wafer yield, and product development time to supplement the tradi-
tional managerial accounting system. The TQM program was a dramatic success. Yield
doubled, cycle time was cut in half, and product defects fell by a factor of ten. However,
Analog's financial performance worsened. To explore the apparent paradox we develop a
detailed simulation model of Analog, including operations, financial and cost accounting, prod-
uct development, human resources, the competitive environment, and the financial markets. We
used econometric estimation, interviews, observation, and archival data to specify and estimate
the model. We find that employee-based improvement programs like TQM can present a firm
with a tradeoff between short and long run effects. In the long run TQM can increase productiv-
ity, raise quality, and lower costs. In the short run, these improvements can interact with prevail-
ing accounting systems and organizational routines to create excess capacity, financial stress, and
pressures for layoffs that undercut commitment to continuous improvement. We explore policies
to integrate improvement programs like TQM with the dynamics of the firm as a whole to
promote sustained improvement in financial as well as nonfinancial measures of performance.
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1. Introduction
In 1987 Analog Devices, Inc. (ADI), a leading manufacturer of specialized integrated
circuits, initiated a broad-based Total Quality Management (TQM) program. Led by its founder
and CEO, Ray Stata, the company introduced TQM into daily activities. Analog created new
metrics for defects in manufacturing, distribution and product development, and assessed
progress against quality goals for each business unit. Quality improved dramatically: by 1990
defects in outgoing product had fallen by a factor of 10, semiconductor yield had nearly doubled,
and manufacturing cycle time had fallen by half. One would expect such dramatic improvements
to boost the competitiveness of ADI's products, and lead to superior growth and profitability.
Yet during the same period Analog's share price fell from $18.75 to $6.25, return on equity fell
from 7% to -4% and ADI was forced into its first-ever layoff. What happened, and why?
The paradox of large improvements in quality that are not followed by financial
improvement is not unique. The Wallace Co., a 1990 winner of the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award, suffered large losses soon after winning the prize. Despite laying off more than
one-fourth of the workforce to cut costs, the company filed for bankruptcy protection in 1991. In
a recent study, Ernst and Young (1991) found firms pursuing TQM grew no faster and were no
more profitable than comparable firms that hadn't. Interest in the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award is falling (Fuchsberg 1993), and press reports skeptical of TQM are appearing
(Newman 1991, The Economist 1992, Taylor 1992). The growing evidence that TQM as
currently practiced may not lead to competitive advantage or superior financial results stands in
stark contrast to the broad diffusion of TQM throughout the corporate and academic world.
The case of Analog Devices is intriguing because it defies all the obvious explanations
for TQM's unfulfilled promises. Some argue that TQM doesn't really work, that TQM is merely
another management fad (Harte 1992). Yet there is considerable evidence that TQM often
results in significant defect reduction and quality improvement. The US General Accounting
Office found that quality improved substantially in twenty finalists from the first two years of the
Baldrige Award competition (GAO 1991). However, the same study showed these firms realized
negligible improvements in return on assets and return on sales.
Another common explanation for the indifferent results of many TQM programs is poor
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implementation. The human resources and organizational development literatures stress that
TQM and similar workplace innovations must be integrated with other human resource policies
such as employment security and with the overall strategy of the firm (Kochan, Katz, and
McKersie 1986, Beer, Spector, and Eisenstadt 1990, Kaufman 1992, Lawler, Mohrman, and
Ledford 1992, Beaumont, Hunter, and Phayre 1993, Appelbaum and Batt 1994). Weak leader-
ship, low workforce commitment, inadequate training and support, inadequate metrics or coun-
terproductive incentives can surely dash a program on the rocks of organizational resistance and
internal politics. Field studies conducted at MIT have documented many such 'TQM implemen-
tation false starts' (Balz and Garberding 1993, Brown and Tse 1992, Ehrler and Jansen 1993,
Kim 1993, Kim and Burchill 1992, Peterson and How 1993, Schmidt 1992). Such theories
predict that poorly implemented TQM programs will not lead to significant improvement. Yet
these theories can not explain the case of Analog Devices - its program produced large
improvements in quality and productivity.
An alternative explanation suggests the worldwide recession masked the benefits of
TQM. According to this theory, the unexpectedly severe recession in the computer and
semiconductor industry beginning around 1989 caused the decline in Analog's profits and share
price - Analog's financial decline was simply bad luck. However, these explanations are not
sufficient to explain the magnitude of the decline. The recession did slow growth, but during the
period after the TQM program was initiated (1987 to 1990) Analog underperformed the semi-
conductor industry in revenue growth, profit, and net worth (Value Line 1991b).
Analog's TQM experience is paradoxical not because TQM failed to improve operations
but because its financial results did not improve after the TQM program succeeded. The resolu-
tion of the paradox must lie in the side effects of successful improvement, not in forces that
impede change or in external economic events.
This paper explores the causes and consequences of the paradox. How does TQM inter-
act with the organization as a whole? How does it alter relationships coupling the firm to its
customers, suppliers, and competitors? How might initial success lead to unintended conse-
quences that slow or thwart continuous improvement? What policies might mitigate such side
effects? We will show that without TQM Analog would have been even worse off - TQM
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unquestionably benefited the company. However, improvement programs can create a tradeoff
between long and short run effects. Quality programs can quickly boost productivity,
augmenting capacity and lowering direct costs. Generating demand to absorb the increase in
capacity and reduce indirect costs requires reorientation of basic strategies and capabilities such
as product development, sales, and marketing. These complex activities are inherently slow to
change, however. Thus the short run effect of successful improvement can be excess capacity.
In the short run, improvements in productivity and quality may interact with prevailing account-
ing systems and organizational routines so that performance is lower than potential.
Our approach involved three steps. First we constructed a detailed history of TQM at
Analog Devices using interview, archival and statistical data (section 2). We then generated
hypotheses about the decision processes and feedback structures that created that history. Third,
we developed a formal simulation model of ADI and its competitive environment to test these
hypotheses and explore policies. The behavioral decision rules are based on the field data, and
were tested by various means, including econometric estimation (where possible). The model, its
empirical support, and validation tests are described in sections 3-4. Analysis shows how suc-
cessful improvement created excess capacity and lower prices, contributing to lower earnings
and market value, which in turn fed back to undermine continued improvement (section 5). We
test alternative strategies for the management of TQM (section 6). In the discussion we consider
implications of the results for TQM in particular and organizational change programs in general,
and conclude with some reflections on the nature of TQM and directions for further research.
2. TQM at Analog Devices, Inc. 1
Analog Devices makes integrated circuits and systems that convert between analog and
digital data. Their products are used in equipment such as computer disk drives, compact disk
players, and medical instruments. Analog has about 5200 employees and worldwide operations
and sales. In fiscal 1992 operating profits were $26 million on sales of $567 million.
Analog has successfully pursued a strategy of technology leadership, seeking to be the
first to market with new products offering superior performance. Analog's strategy enabled it to
dominate the high-end niche of the market. From its founding through the early 1980s sales
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grew at an average rate of 27% per year. "Then for the first time," as Stata (1989) described it,
"we missed our five year goals - and by a country mile." Stata rejected explanations that pinned
the blame on the economy. He suspected "that there was something about the way we were
managing the company that was not good enough" and concluded "The bottleneck is manage-
ment innovation." To pursue his vision, Stata helped create the Center for Quality Management,
an industry-university consortium dedicated to the development and diffusion of TQM
knowledge throughout American industry (Walden and Lee 1992).
In bringing TQM to Analog Stata provided passionate and committed leadership. Analog
designed an innovative quality improvement program (Analog Devices 1991), drawing on the
principles espoused by many leaders of the TQM movement (Deming 1986, Feigenbaum 1983,
Ishikawa 1985, Garvin 1988, Juran 1988, Shiba, Walden and Graham 1993). First, Stata created
the office of Quality VP, on the same level as the heads of traditional functions such as
engineering and sales. As Quality VP Stata hired Art Schneiderman, an experienced quality
consultant. Analog provided training for managers throughout the company. Next they
introduced the 'half-life system' (Schneiderman 1988), a method for setting realistic quality
targets and monitoring performance against them. Finally, they created a 'balanced scorecard'
(Kaplan and Norton 1992) linking these targets to incentive and reward systems.
The half-life system was based on Schneiderman's (1988) finding that, in a wide variety
of firms, "any defect level, subjected to legitimate QIP [quality improvement processes],
decreases at a constant [fractional] rate...." The result is an exponential decline in defects. The
speed of defect reduction can be characterized by the 'improvement half-life' - the time required
for defects to fall by 50%.
The basis for the half-life dynamic is the iterative learning loop at the heart of TQM.
Participants in quality improvement processes diagnose the root causes of the defects in any
process and rank them in order of importance, using Pareto charts and Ishikawa diagrams
(Analog Devices 1991). They then design, test, evaluate, and implement solutions using a
version of the Shewhart/Deming Plan-Do-Check-Act or 'PDCA' cycle (Shewhart 1939, Walton
1986). The improvement team continues to loop around the learning cycle until they correct the
source of the defect, at which point they move on to the next most important defect and begin the
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process again. The fractional rate of improvement can thus be expressed as:
0 = I-L (1)
where ) is the fractional rate of defect reduction per month, I is the fractional improvement per
learning cycle, and L is the number of learning cycles per month. Fractional rather than absolute
improvements per cycle are expected since typical distributions of the causes of defects are not
uniform, and the causes with largest payoff are addressed first. Defects at time t, D, are then
governed by
dD/dt = -(D - Dmin), (2)
where Dmin 2 0 is the theoretical minimum defect level. Thus D = Diin + (DtO-Dmin)exp(-O(t-
to)) and the half-life th = ln(2)/. 2
Improvement half-lives vary across processes and functions. Figure 1 summarizes the
relationship Schneiderman hypothesized between the technical and organizational complexity of
a process and its improvement half-life. Comparatively simple processes like the functioning of
a single piece of equipment on the factory floor were found to have half-lives on the order of a
few months. Complex processes like product development had half lives on the order of a few
years. Equation (1) explains why this is so: Both the improvement per cycle and the number of
cycles per month depend on the technological and organizational complexity of the process to be
improved. Improvement per cycle will be large and the improvement cycle will be rapid for
simple processes where experiments can be implemented rapidly and the results observed
immediately, cause and effect are easily discerned, the process is well understood, problem
solving teams involve fewer people from fewer functional backgrounds, and few organizational
boundaries and layers are crossed. Conversely, improvement per cycle will be lower, and cycle
time will be longer, for processes where experiments are difficult and time consuming, actions
have multiple, distant and delayed consequences, the process is poorly understood, problem
solving involves coordination and cooperation of many people with diverse skills and interests,
and multiple organizations within and outside the firm are involved.
Analog implemented the half-life concept by setting performance targets for product
defects, delivery lead time, and on-time delivery performance for the five year plan beginning in
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1987 (table 1). They designed a balanced scorecard that displayed, for each division, the
predicted and actual performance on a variety of nonfinancial measures of performance. The
scorecard (table 2) summarized financial and nonfinancial metrics in a convenient format, allow-
ing management to evaluate progress objectively. 3 The scorecard also identified divisions with
exceptionally good or poor performance, generating intense internal competition around the
speed of defect reduction among the divisions.
By July 1990 Analog had accomplished remarkable results. Defects in product shipped
plummeted from 500 to 50 PPM, on-time delivery (OTD) rose from 70% to 96%, average yield
soared from 26% to 51%, and cycle time fell from 15 to 8 weeks (Kaplan 1990b). Several indi-
cators, however, had not improved. Product development time had not fallen significantly and
the stock price had dropped from $24 in July 1987 to a low of about $6 in November 1990, a
larger drop than that for the semiconductor industry or the market as a whole. In 1985 Operating
income was $46.6 million. In 1990, during the recession, it fell to $6.2 million. A senior
manager estimated that with its depressed market value, Analog could have been acquired for
about three years cash flow from operations. Responding to the financial crisis, Analog
consolidated some previously separate operations, changed distribution channels, and reoriented
product development away from the core business of standard linear integrated circuits (SLICs)
towards emerging markets for special purpose chips (SPLICs) and digital signal processors
(DSPs) . Analog also acquired one of its leading competitors, Precision Monolithics, Inc. (PMI).
Analog took an $18 million charge for expenses related to the restructuring.
The impact of the consolidation and restructuring on the TQM effort was significant.
Responding to the financial crisis, consolidating operations, and managing the acquisition were
time consuming for both management and the workforce. Analog sought to avoid layoffs by
transferring people to other operations wherever possible, but such transfers took time from
TQM activities for the affected workers, their managers and the employees in the divisions to
which they were transferred. A senior human resource manager noted that during this time
"TQM couldn't get the attention it deserved."
Reorganizing operations to take advantage of the productivity gains generated by TQM
was not sufficient to alleviate the financial stresses. In 1990 Analog was forced to reduce
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"worldwide employment by nearly 12%, while simultaneously transferring approximately 150
manufacturing jobs to our low cost assembly and test operation in the Philippines and Taiwan"
(1991 Annual Report, 1). These layoffs were Analog's first. While Analog provided extensive
outplacement assistance for the affected workers, the effect on morale was substantial. The HR
manager recalled "morale was low but we got high marks for our efforts to help people."
Nevertheless, the consolidation and layoffs "were confusing and threatening to some people." A
manager of the TQM activity in one of the divisions noted "a lot of [employees in a particular
plant] were working their tails off for TQM..., and their reward was their [operation] was moved
to the Philippines in search of lower cost labor. So [TQM] was another path to a layoff."
Schneiderman commented "Up until the layoff the number of QIP teams was steadily growing.
After the layoff, TQM stalled. People didn't want to improve so much that their job would be
eliminated." By July 1992 OTD fell back to 89%, outgoing defects and average yields stalled at
50 PPM and 49%, respectively; and product development time had still not fallen significantly
(Schneiderman, personal communication). The stock price had increased to about $9.00. By
1993 Analog had recovered significantly, with the stock price rising above $20/share. 4
3. The Organizational Dynamics of TQM
Analog's experience illustrates the complexity of organizational change programs such as
TQM. It is difficult to test the many rival hypotheses to explain the impact of organizational
interventions such as TQM because it is not possible to conduct experiments with the real
organizations. In such settings, models provide a means to explore the likely consequences of
alternative policies and environmental circumstances. Capturing complex interventions such as
quality improvement programs in a model requires a methodology that can represent the physical
and institutional structure of the firm and its markets, that can portray the decision processes of
the various actors in the system, including the role of soft variables such as workforce
commitment, morale, and fear of job losses, and that can deal with multiple levels of analysis
(the shop floor, product development, competitor reactions, the stock market). For these reasons
we used the system dynamics method (Forrester 1961, Richardson 1991, Roberts 1978) to guide
the development of the theory and build the model.
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We drew on multiple data sources to develop and test the model. We conducted inter-
views with key participants in Analog's TQM effort and other personnel in product development,
TQM, and manufacturing. Other primary sources included internal company presentations and
materials, published materials on Analog's approach to TQM, public financial data, and internal
data on the various metrics of quality used in the balanced scorecard. Secondary sources such as
Kaplan (1990a and 1990b) were used as well. We drew upon established system dynamics
models of the firm (e.g. Forrester 1961, Lyneis 1980), prior applications of system dynamics to
corporate strategy and organizational behavior (e.g. Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991, Hall 1976,
1983, 1984, Morecroft 1985; Roberts 1978), and experimental studies of managerial decision
making in complex dynamic systems (Sterman 1989a, 1989b; Paich and Sterman 1993, Lant
1992) to guide formulation of the model and the decision rules for the actors.
The model has a broad boundary (figure 2; table 3 summarizes the major endogenous and
exogenous variables). 5 The endogenous variables include physical variables such as orders,
shipments, production, wafer starts, finished goods inventories and in-process inventories; finan-
cial accounting information including a full income statement, balance sheet and cash flow
statement; managerial accounting data such as overhead absorption and labor and materials vari-
ances; quality metrics including product defects, manufacturing cycle time, delivery time, on
time delivery percentage, and manufacturing yield; motivational variables such as the commit-
ment of the workforce to TQM, the support resources provided for the TQM effort, the work-
force's perceived job security, and top management commitment to TQM. The model contains
only five exogenous inputs: the producer price index and labor cost index to capture inflation in
input costs; a macroeconomic index of the demand for electronic components (capturing the
effect of the recession on industry demand); the yield of the S&P 500 (a determinant of the
discount rate investors use to value Analog's expected earnings); and an index of the diffusion of
TQM throughout US industry (a determinant of how quickly ADI's competitors can improve as a
result of their own TQM efforts). While the model is too large to describe fully here, we discuss
two formulations important in understanding the dynamics of TQM: the market demand for
ADI's products (a hard variable for which good numerical data exist) and the commitment of the
workforce to the TQM program (a soft variable for which numerical data do not exist).
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3.1 Modeling the Product Life Cycle
The dynamics of demand are critical to the impact of TQM on Analog. Improvements in
product quality and delivery reliability boost product attractiveness, potentially increasing market
share in existing product lines. Improvements in product development can speed the introduc-
tion of new and better products, creating new markets. Market demand is therefore endogenous
to the model. ADI receives a share of the total demand for products in the market segments in
which it competes. The attractiveness of ADI's products relative to those of competitors
determines market share. For a product of given functionality, a customer judges the
attractiveness of ADI's products by considering the price, defect rate, delivery lead time, delivery
reliability, and their dependence on individual vendors (the extent to which Analog's customers
depend on ADI as a sole source). Attractiveness is nonlinear and falls dramatically if any one of
the attributes is particularly poor, even if the others are favorable. For example, if product lead
times become excessively large, attractiveness and market share plummet even if price is below
the competition. Thus we formulate attractiveness as a multiplicative function of price, defects,
delivery lead time, on-time-delivery percentage, and ADI's market share.
The total size of the market for Analog's products depends on the number and market
potential of each product in ADI's portfolio. Following ADI's own practice, we disaggregate the
product portfolio into two categories: 'breakthrough' products - those products focused on an
entirely new market segment; and line extensions - incremental improvements to existing prod-
ucts. The model represents the aggregate of ADI's portfolio of products. We describe the
formulation for breakthrough products here; we model line extensions analogously.
The number of breakthrough products on the market, B, increases as Analog releases new
products and decreases as Analog discontinues old products. The product development
subsystem determines introductions and the average product life, , determines discards:
dB/dt = bi -bd (3)
bd = B/t (4)
where bi is the rate of product introductions and bd is the rate of product discontinuation.
Market demand for a given product depends on its potential applications. Demand also
depends critically on where the product is in its life cycle (Gort and Klepper 1982). Sales of new
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breakthrough products typically rise rapidly, then peak and decline as new products and new
technologies supersede them. The total demand for a breakthrough product increases by an
amount p. each time a new product is introduced. Industry demand for that product then grows at
a fractional rate g, reflecting the rate of economic growth and the stage of the product in its life
cycle. The total demand for breakthrough products, M, is the sum of the market demand for
each product in the portfolio. We assume that each time a product is discontinued the total
potential market decreases by the average sales per product, M/B. Thus:
dM/dt = bi -bd(M/B) + gM (5)
The fractional market growth rate, g, is a decreasing function of the average age of the product
portfolio, A, and rises with the rate of growth of the computer/electronics industry, ge:
g=f{A) +ge, f'{.} <0, f"{.}> 0. (6)
We used the Federal Reserve industrial production index for electronic components as a proxy
for demand in Analog's industry. The function f{A) captures the dynamics of the product life
cycle. We estimated equation (6) using a data set ADI provided consisting of annual unit sales
categorized by product and vintage for every product introduced between 1970 and 1991.
Specifically, the fractional change in sales for each observation is estimated by:
gi,A,t = a + [(Ai,t)Y + 5get + et (7)
where gi,A,t is the fractional change in sales of product i with age A in year t and ge is the frac-
tional growth in the Federal Reserve index of industrial production of electronic components in
year t. We estimated the equation by nonlinear least squares. The product age variable is highly
significant, while the economic growth term ge is not.6 Sales of typical new products grow at
about 100% per year during the first several years (figure 3). The fractional growth rate slows as
the products diffuse through the marketplace. Products mature after six to eight years, followed
by gradual decline until they are withdrawn or replaced by line extensions. While some products
may enjoy steady sales for a decade, vigorous demand growth requires the continuous
introduction of new products.
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3.2 Building Commitment to TQM
A hallmark of TQM is employee involvement: quality improvement teams consist of the
same people who do the work (Shiba, Walden and Graham 1993). Thus the improvement half-
life depends not only on the complexity of the process but also on the skills, efforts, and
commitment of the workforce, as well as the support and training they receive. Generalizing
Schneiderman's half-life model, eq. (2), we assume the fractional improvement rate, 0, for a pro-
cess with defect rate D is a function of the commitment of the workforce, C. Because changes in
product mix, equipment, and employees may render prior improvements obsolete and introduce
new defects, quality also decays towards the initial level Do at a fractional rate i:
dD/dt = - C}[D - Dmin]+TI[D - D]; '{I} 2 0. (8)
The decay term rl[Do - D] captures several processes. To the extent changes in opera-
tions leading to improvements are embedded in the knowledge of workers or in the capital stock,
they may be lost as employees and equipment turn over. Second, changes in customer require-
ments or the product mix may lead to changes in equipment, operations, and organization that
introduce new defects. The fractional decay rate rl is likely to be low for processes where the
improvements leading to higher quality are embedded in physical capital (e.g. changes in plant
layout that streamline transfers between workstations) and higher in processes requiring substan-
tial human input (e.g. scheduling delivery dates). Areas where technology or customer require-
ments are changing rapidly also lead to larger Ti. For example, customer delivery requirements
change frequently as customer production requirements and product lines change. Thus we
assume 1 is small for manufacturing yield, plant cycle time, and process defects, and higher for
on time delivery. The decay term means a certain rate of improvement activity is required
simply to maintain defects at a given level - that is, there must be ongoing maintenance to com-
pensate for the inevitable changes in the environment and decay of the equipment.
The current commitment of the workforce to TQM is defined as the fraction of the work-
force currently applying TQM methods at a high level of commitment and competency.
Commitment varies from 0 < C < 100% of a fully committed workforce. We model commitment
as a diffusion process driven by both a management-led 'push' and a results 'pull' (Shiba,
Walden and Graham 1993):
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dC/dt = O(C* - C) + wC(1-C). (9)
The first term in eq. (9) captures management's 'push'. When management initiates a TQM
program the commitment of the workforce rises gradually, at a fractional rate 0, towards C*, the
commitment and competency achievable through the leadership and training provided by
management. The effectiveness of management's efforts to promote TQM, C*, depends on how
much attention management can devote to TQM. The attention devoted to TQM by management
is endogenous. For example, C* falls when other issues, such as dealing with financial stress,
demand more of management's attention. The second term represents the 'pull' effect generated
by successful results. The more people are involved in TQM efforts, the more they will
communicate their enthusiasm to others through word of mouth, presentations, and other
encounters with colleagues. Thus the pull effect is proportional to the current commitment level
and the word of mouth effect, w, creating a positive feedback loop by which commitment can be
self-generating (provided word of mouth is favorable). The impact of word of mouth is
necessarily limited as commitment approaches 100% by the term (1-C).
Word of mouth can have a positive or negative impact on commitment. We model the
sign and strength of the word of mouth effect, w, as depending on the perceived improvement
resulting from TQM ('does it work?'), the adequacy of the support for TQM provided by man-
agement ('is help available; will TQM effort be rewarded?') and the security and stability of the
workforce ('if we don't cut costs and move product I might lose my job, so I don't have time for
TQM', or 'with this reorganization going on, I don't have time for TQM'). The overall impact of
these factors is mediated by the average intensity of communication in the organization, . Thus
w = o[frr} + fa(a} + fs{s}] (10)
where fr{r) is the impact of results, r, on word of mouth; fatal is the impact of the adequacy of
management support, a, on word of mouth; and fs { s) is the impact of perceived job security and
stability, s, on word of mouth. The nonlinear functions f{. } may be positive or negative. For
example, when TQM effort yields strong evidence of improvement (when r is high), the positive
word of mouth encourages others to begin to their own TQM efforts. As perceived improvement
declines, the benefits of TQM are less obvious and less effective in persuading colleagues to
12
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jump on the TQM bandwagon. Thus fr(O} = 0, fr({- > 0, fr' > 0, and fr" < 0 for r > 0.
Support resources also affect workers' attitudes towards TQM. TQM initiatives require
support from management in the form of assistance with tools and process, rewards and recogni-
tion. Resources such as time or staff are needed to enable people to participate in TQM and still
do their normal jobs. We model the adequacy of support resources, a, as the ratio of the support
available to that required. Support requirements are proportional to the rate of TQM effort and
thus to commitment. Support resources depend in part on management's focus: as management
shifts its attention to financial firefighting and organizational restructuring, managerial attention
and support for TQM falls. The assumed relationship fa{ } is an s-curve such that fa { 1 } = 0 and
fa' {. } > 0. Finally, worker perceptions of job security and stability affect attitudes towards
TQM. If workers are threatened or overburdened by layoffs and reorganizations, if they are
preoccupied by the turmoil caused by financial crisis and pressures to cut costs, word of mouth
will be negative. We define job security and stability from 0 (financial stress, consolidation
and/or layoffs cause severe turmoil) to 1 (workers have confidence in the stability of the current
organization and do not fear layoffs). Thus fs{ 1 } = 0, and fr{ ) < 0 for 0 < s < 1.
The interplay of leadership, results, support, and job security thus determines the dynam-
ics of commitment. For example, the introduction of TQM by management creates some com-
mitment, stimulating initial improvement efforts. Provided support resources are adequate and
job stability is high, strong early results of the improvement effort will encourage others to par-
ticipate in TQM, leading to still greater results. Commitment will diffuse rapidly, reach a high
level, and defects will fall. However, if rising commitment takes too much time away from
people's primary jobs, or if the productivity gains created by improvement lead to reorganization
and job losses, the negative effects of inadequate support and low morale could overwhelm the
effect of results and cause commitment to fall. Thus the feedbacks from the diffusion of com-
mitment to the rest of the organization are critical. These feedbacks are captured endogenously
in the full model, and as will be seen, play a crucial role in the dynamics of TQM at Analog.
4. Comparison to Historical Behavior
Model testing in system dynamics emphasizes a wide range of tests, including tests of
model structure as well as correspondence with historical behavior (Forrester 1961, Forrester and
13
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Senge 1980, Barlas 1989). The model's structure and parameters were verified through a series
of meetings with various Analog executives and managers. The robustness of the model was
assessed through extreme conditions tests. The structures important to understanding the impact
of TQM on Analog and assessing policies are endogenous so feedback effects and possible
reactions to policies are captured. We conducted a variety of sensitivity tests, both of parametric
sensitivity and sensitivity to the level of aggregation. We used partial model testing (Homer
1983) to test the structure and parameters of each major subsystem in the model (e.g., product
development, the share price). In partial model testing the endogenous inputs to each subsystem
are replaced with the corresponding historical data. Significant deviations from historical
behavior in the output of the subsystem reveal formulation or parametric errors.
We then assessed the ability of the full endogenous system to replicate the data. We
consider various goodness-of-fit measures including the mean absolute percent error (MAPE)
between simulated and actual data and the Theil inequality statistics (Theil 1966). The Theil
statistics partition the mean square error between model and data among three components: bias
(unequal means of simulated and actual data); unequal variation (unequal variances); and
unequal covariation (imperfect correlation between the two series). Sterman (1984) shows how
these components of error can be used to diagnose formulation flaws in simulation models.
The simulation begins in 1985; most of the historical data run through 1991. 7 We assess
the historical fit of the model against twelve variables for which time series data were available,
including financial and operational measures (table 4, figures 4-5). The fit of the model overall
is quite good. The MAPE ranges from 3% to 22% and R2 ranges from .69 to .99. The fits for
unit sales, revenue, cost of goods sold, R&D budget, and cumulative new products introduced
are excellent, with R2 > .89, mean absolute percent errors < 7%, low bias and low unequal
variation. The operational measures of performance - yield, defects, on time delivery and cycle
time - have more variation than the aggregate measures, so the MAPE tends to be slightly larger.
Still, yield, cycle time, and OTD have MAPE < 11% and R 2 > 77%, and the majority of the error
is unsystematic noise for all three. The MAPE for defects is 20%, but the R 2 = .93 and there is
negligible bias (the comparatively large error is due to the assumption that TQM starts at the
same moment in all activities, while actual start times differed). Model fits for the share price
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and for market value/cash flow, a measure of vulnerability to takeover, are quite good, with
MAPE = .12 and .17, respectively, R2 = .81 and .79, respectively, and negligible bias and
unequal variation error. The largest error is in operating income, with MAPE = 22% and R 2 =
.69. Operating income is the small difference of two large numbers (revenue less cost), so small
errors in revenue or cost create much larger percentage errors in income. While unbiased,
simulated operating income has a slightly lower variance than the actual data, which are quite
noisy. Overall the model's ability to replicate Analog's experience endogenously, from the
factory floor to the financial markets, is good.
5. Results: Base Case
TQM in the simulations begins on 1 January 1987 with the creation of the office of the
VP for Quality, the introduction of the balanced scorecard, and training in TQM methods for
managers and the workforce. 8 These activities raise commitment to TQM (figure 6a), leading to
initial quality improvement efforts in various divisions. At first, job security and stability is high
and resources are ample to support the relatively few initial efforts (figure 6b, 6c). The improve-
ments flowing from these initial efforts are widely publicized throughout the company, leading
to positive word of mouth that increases commitment still further. As more and more people
throughout the company jump on the TQM bandwagon, defects begin to fall throughout the
manufacturing organization (figure 5).
As the number of improvement teams grows and TQM diffuses throughout Analog,
management support becomes inadequate. At the beginning Art Schneiderman and his small
staff could provide extensive guidance, support, and cheerleading to the small number of initial
projects. As TQM diffused, however, line managers throughout the firm were called on to
provide support for improvement teams in their areas, and continue to do their normal jobs as
well. However their training, experience, and available time were not always adequate, and the
quality of support fell (figure 6c).
Management attention is also limited and must be allocated among competing demands.
In the model managerial attention is allocated differentially as a function of perceived improve-
ment in different sectors. The quality VP said "some people saw the value of TQM right away,
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but the majority needed to see results before committing themselves, and a few resisted and
could never be persuaded. We needed to demonstrate that TQM worked for Analog to bring the
skeptical majority on board, so we spent a lot of our time on projects we thought would succeed
early on." Thus we assume managers turn their attention towards areas in which improvements
become visible quickly. The result is a pair of positive feedback loops which reward the areas
improving faster with the support they need to improve still more, while starving the slow
improving areas of resources, further impeding their progress. In the model, as in reality,
improvement came first and quickest in manufacturing, and was slower in product development
and other management functions. As discussed above, Schneiderman expected this to be so: the
half lives of operations-level processes, with relatively low technical and organizational com-
plexity, were expected to be a few months while the half-lives for complex processes like assess-
ing customer requirements and developing new products were expected to be several years.
Thus the manufacturing area receives a larger share of support resources from 1987 through 1990
as it demonstrates the quickest results (figure 6d).
Commitment to improvement in the product development area lags behind manufactur-
ing, since results have not yet been observed and inadequate support leads to frustration.
Schneiderman said "Many engineers didn't think TQM could improve product development and
thought it interfered with their autonomy. The requests for help we received came primarily
from the operations side." Stata was more blunt: "There is some closeted cynicism about quality
in the company. Among the engineers, it isn't even closeted. They think it's crap" (Jacob 1993).
Due to poor support and low commitment reported product development times do not exhibit
appreciable improvement, despite the potential to fall with a half-life of 24 months (figure 6e).
To stimulate demand, Analog had to restructure its strategy and capabilities to align
better with changes in technology, competition, and customer needs. These efforts included
shifting R&D effort towards SPLICs and DSPs, attempts to speed product development, and
changes in distribution channels. Intrinsically greater complexity means improvement half-lives
for these activities are long, limiting the short-run impact of strategic reorientation on demand.
Thus efforts to speed new product development and reorient Analog's capabilities to
better meet changing customer needs could not stimulate demand fast enough to match the
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improvement in capacity caused by faster cycle time, higher yield, and fewer defects. However,
improvements in product quality and delivery lead to higher product attractiveness. If higher
quality allowed Analog to capture additional market share sales might rise enough to match the
increase in effective capacity. This was not the case. Analog's simulated market share rises
slightly until early 1988 but then falls back despite the large increase in product quality (figure
6f). There are several reasons for the failure of higher quality to generate permanently higher
market share. First, Analog's share in some of its key markets was already very high. Some
customers were reluctant to further increase their dependence on Analog as a sole source
supplier. 9 Second, Analog's competitors were not standing still. TQM knowledge is not
privately appropriable. Through benchmarking, conferences, training, and consultants TQM
knowledge diffuses rapidly, so competitor quality improves and prices fall. Indeed, Stata helped
create the Center for Quality Management precisely to increase the adoption of TQM throughout
the business community, including the electronics industry; through his publications and
speeches he stimulated many firms to adopt TQM earlier than they might have. Thus the attrac-
tiveness of the competitor's products rises along with Analog's (though with a lag). The
industry-wide improvement in quality generated benefits captured by Analog's customers rather
than rents or market share advantage for Analog.
As TQM boosted capacity and productivity, Analog's unit production costs dropped. Our
interviews indicated that, as in many firms (see e.g. Cyert and March 1963), Analog sets prices
by marking up unit production costs by a standard percentage. The traditional markup ratio, a
little over 200%, was sufficient to cover indirect costs per unit and provide a reasonable return.
The traditional markup changed only slowly. Thus as unit costs fell so did average prices.
Between 1985 and 1989, unit production costs fell by about 16%, and average selling prices fell
by just over 17% (table 5). However, indirect costs per unit fell only slightly. R&D, sales, mar-
keting, distribution, and management, the activities driving indirect costs, all have high technical
and organizational complexity. They have intrinsically longer improvement half lives than the
manufacturing activities driving unit production costs. Further, as discussed above, commitment
to TQM in these areas was low, slowing improvement below the already low potential rate. By
1989 unit indirect costs had fallen only 9%, much less than the drop in unit production costs.
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Though falling in absolute terms, indirect costs became a larger fraction of total costs. Analog's
traditional gross margins were no longer sufficient to cover indirect costs and yield a reasonable
profit. Operating income per unit fell by 45% (table 5).10
Analog's stock price fell as earnings dropped and as investment analysts responded to the
rising indirect cost fraction by criticizing what they took to be ADI's apparent lack of cost
control. Value Line's reports were typical:
"... we caution our readers that this company has a history of frequent earnings
disappointments." (Value Line 1991 a)
"Sales may be difficult to predict, but it is hard to understand why Analog can not cope
with this problem by adjusting expenses accordingly." (Value Line 1991b)
"Analog needs to develop cost control ability to match its technological skill and sales
growth. The company has enjoyed fairly steady revenue increases...Its earnings record
has been inconsistent enough, however, to make one think that Analog's priorities are not
what investors seek."(Value Line 1992)
Between 1987 and 1990 the simulated stock price falls (figure 4) as revenue growth slows, earn-
ings decline, and the simulated capital markets grow concerned about ADI's high costs. As
share prices fall, the ratio of Analog's market value to cash flow drops below 6 years (figure 6g),
making Analog vulnerable to takeover attempts (a hostile acquirer could pay off the cost of
gaining 51% control with just three years of current cash flow). The pressure to boost the share
price by cutting costs and trimming excess capacity led Analog to consolidate many operations
and lay off about nine percent of its workforce. In the model, the financial stress leads to layoffs
in mid-1990, roughly the same timing as in reality. Managing the consolidation and assisting
those who lost their jobs all take time away from TQM activities, and the anxiety and confusion
caused by the layoffs hurt morale. Job security and stability plummet (figure 6b) and commit-
ment to TQM in manufacturing falls (figure 6a). Improvement stalls, and on time delivery falls
back from its peak (figure 5). With quality stagnant but the competitors' still improving,
Analog's competitive position deteriorated. Schneiderman recalled: "In 1989, thanks to our
TQM program, we made it to number one on H[ewlett] P[ackard]'s list of top ten suppliers.
After TQM stopped in 1991, we became number two on their list of ten worst suppliers."
The base case shows that TQM unquestionably benefited the company. Rapid improve-
ments in yield and cycle time boosted productivity, lowered unit costs and roughly doubled
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Analog's production capacity. But TQM also created unanticipated side effects. The side effects
arise from the interactions of TQM with the accounting system, with organizational norms and
routines, and with the expectations and behavior of other organizations such as the financial
markets. For example, TQM caused manufacturing yield to double in just three years. But in the
short run, as yields rose above the historical levels used in production scheduling, excess inven-
tory accumulated. Attempts to speed new products to market clashed with goals for lower cycle
time and higher on time delivery, since running test lots of new products often requires the same
equipment needed to make current products. Management's desire to build commitment to TQM
by demonstrating early results focused attention on operational issues and slowed progress in
new product development, contributing to excess capacity.
Most important, improvement was faster in operations and slower in R&D, marketing,
distribution, and management. Thus TQM disrupted the traditional relationship between direct
and indirect costs, relationships embodied in organizational norms for price setting. Because unit
production costs fell faster than indirect costs, the traditional markup was no longer adequate to
cover indirect costs, leading to lower operating income, lower stock prices, financial stress, and
ultimately, to layoffs.
5.1 Analog Devices in 1993
Thus the very success of TQM creates imbalances and side effects that can feed back in
the short run to undermine commitment to continuous improvement. At Analog the side effects
of successful improvement were severe, even threatening Analog's survival as an independent
firm. Analog did survive, however, and by mid 1993 had recovered significantly. In 1990
Analog acquired Precision Monolithics, one of its competitors. With lower costs and a modest
recovery from the recession, net income in 1992 had grown to $15 million on sales of $567
million. The stock price in May 1993 had rebounded to about $20/share, a rise of more than
300% from the trough in 1990, compared to a rise of about 45% for the S&P 500 as a whole.
The simulated Analog recovers as well, even without the acquisition - though without the
possibility of a takeover either. A weaker firm, or a firm experiencing these difficulties when
capital to fund takeovers was more readily available, might not have survived.
TQM at Analog has rebounded as well. Our interviews show that morale among
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employees has recovered significantly from the lows of 1990-91. A second wave of TQM
activity is underway. Unlike the first wave, current efforts emphasize improvements in product
development and the other drivers of indirect costs. Stata is personally involved in many of these
quality efforts, chairing the quality steering committee and attending the annual 'QIP-fests' -
gatherings where TQM successes and methods are shared. These meetings have attracted
growing numbers of teams since they began in 1990, and a growing fraction of these teams come
from engineering, sales, and administration. Market research firm Dataquest recently named
Analog "the best midsize semiconductor supplier for the second year in a row" (Jacob 1993, 67).
Most of these recent developments were predicted by the model. Figure 6b shows
simulated job security and stability recovering after 1991 as improving financial results boost
morale. As morale recovers, a second wave of TQM begins in the model around 1992 (figure
6a). The second wave in the model, as in reality, stresses improvement in product development
and the other drivers of indirect costs: commitment to TQM in product development rises
swiftly after 1992 (figure 6a) and management support for TQM is more evenly balanced
between product development and manufacturing (figure 6d). The simulated stock price
rebounds from its 1991 lows to about $12/share by the end of 1992, close to the actual value
(figure 4h). It is important to note that these developments in the simulation arise endogenously
and emerged from the model before the evidence for the rebound of TQM activity and recent
financial improvements were available.
6. Policy Tests
6.1. Analog does not implement TQM
The base case shows how Analog's success in reducing defects in their operations,
coming just as the economy weakened and competition intensified, was not sufficient to prevent
financial stress, downsizing, and consequent collapse of commitment to TQM. The obvious
question is then 'what would have happened if Analog had not implemented TQM?' Figure 7
shows the result. This simulation is identical to the base case except that TQM is never imple-
mented. Without the productivity gains stemming from TQM, Analog's costs and investment
needs remain high, reducing competitiveness. Schneiderman commented that "When I arrived
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we were expecting to have to build a new wafer fab for about $100 million. We still haven't had
to build it because yield doubled." Further, though ADI stimulates competitors and customers to
pursue TQM in the Base Case, they eventually adopt TQM on their own even when Analog does
not. As competitor quality outstrips ADI's, and as customers demand their suppliers meet higher
standards for quality, reliability, and cost, the simulated Analog quickly loses market share. By
the beginning of 1991 revenues fall 75% from base case levels and the stock price plummets due
to large ongoing losses. The simulated Analog is forced to begin major layoffs in 1989, earlier
than the base case. Without TQM the company would most likely have been taken over or
forced to exit the industry. While the speed of the decline in the simulation is sensitive to the
assumed rate at which competitors adopt TQM, there is little doubt that Analog's competitors
and customers would have pursued TQM even if Analog did not.
The No-TQM case shows that TQM yielded significant benefits to Analog despite the
difficulties and stresses it created. Indeed, it had to be done. We now explore different policies
Analog might have pursued to integrate TQM better with the rest of the organization and build
sustained commitment to continuous improvement.
6.2. Maintaining the No-Layoff Policy
One of Deming's (1986) precepts for success is to "drive out fear." Since commitment to
TQM was eroded by the 1990 layoff and the consequent fear that productivity improvements
would lead to job losses, we test a policy in which Analog maintains its traditional no-layoff
policy (the workforce may still decline through attrition). The goal is to keep commitment and
morale high so that improvement continues - employees know that ADI will not lay them off,
regardless of any excess labor capacity.
In the short run performance is worse (table 6; figure 8). Maintaining the no-layoff
policy does keep commitment to TQM high in manufacturing, where in the base case the layoffs
cause it to collapse. Nevertheless, the critical defect measures improve only slightly by 1991
compared to the base case. The main near term effect of the no-layoff policy is to keep ADI's
costs from falling, reducing profit and the stock price further below base case levels.
The no-layoff policy does little in the short run because the primary problem is the excess
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capacity created by the successful defect reductions before the layoff, not the failure of defects to
drop further after the layoff. After the layoff, TQM stalled, but by then the 'damage' - the
excess capacity, under absorbed overhead, and reputation for poor cost control - was done. By
the time of the layoff, ADI's stock price had already fallen, forcing management to focus on
short-term financial pressures. Maintaining the no-layoff policy does nothing to prevent these
financial pressures from arising in the first place; rather it intensifies them.
Indeed, despite the no-layoff policy, commitment to TQM in the manufacturing organiza-
tion has fallen from nearly 100% in 1988 to under 60% by 1991. Commitment falls partly
because diminishing returns set in. Having harvested the low-hanging fruit in the first two years
of TQM, further improvements become more difficult, reducing the perceived benefit of
additional effort. Higher commitment created by the no-layoff policy also means there are more
TQM efforts than in the base case. These efforts lead to additional frustration as more
improvement teams seek support from their managers, undercutting commitment. Most
important, however, the no layoff policy significantly intensifies the financial stresses facing
ADI. With lower profitability and stock price, the ratio of market value to free cash flow falls
below the already dangerous levels of the base case, intensifying the threat of a takeover. Even
more of management's attention is diverted from TQM towards short-term financial fire-fighting.
As management support for TQM falls, frustration rises, and TQM commitment falls.
The no-layoff policy ultimately outperforms the base case: by 1993 the policy yields
higher quality, revenue, profits, and stock price, illustrating the 'worse-before-better' tradeoff
between short and long term. However, the model does not include the possibility of shareholder
revolt or hostile takeover, both more likely than in the base case because financial stresses are
more intense in the short run - the company may not have survived as an independent entity long
enough to enjoy the benefits of the no-layoff policy.
Thus job security is no guarantee of TQM success, and may be self-defeating. By pre-
serving jobs in the short run, ADI's financial results worsen, increasing the pressure for layoffs
and the likelihood of top management turnover or outright takeover. In the event of a takeover,
the new management, faced with the need to cut costs, restore profitability, and pay down debt
acquired to finance the acquisition, would almost certainly abandon the no-layoff policy.
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6.3. Maintaining Morale While Downsizing
The no-layoff case illustrates a strong tradeoff between short and long run effects, a
tradeoff Analog might not have survived. To consider how the long-term benefits of employee
security can be maintained while still making the necessary cost reductions, we now consider a
policy of 'wise layoffs.' By wise layoffs we mean a policy in which job reductions are made
without destroying commitment to TQM. Achieving this goal is clearly difficult in a weak econ-
omy. Nevertheless, a number of policies might be effective in reducing the negative effect of
downsizing on workforce commitment and morale: (i) employees who are most successful in
reducing defects and improving quality can be rewarded by keeping their jobs or transferring to
areas where quality did not improve as rapidly, thus creating an incentive to improve more
rapidly rather then less; (ii) TQM tools can be used to identify where cuts should be made, so
that workers understand the rationale for and participate in the decision to cut jobs, thus increas-
ing the perception of fairness among the workforce; (iii) management can seek to persuade the
workforce that without quality improvement more (or all) jobs will be lost to competitors, thus
offsetting the fear of TQM induced layoffs with a greater fear of business failure.
We test a perfect and costless policy in which layoffs have no effect on employee
commitment to TQM (the function fs{ sj is set identically to zero). The policy not only means
employee morale is completely unaffected by layoffs and financial stress, but that the time con-
suming and disruptive changes that accompany downsizing, including deciding where and how
much to cut, providing outplacement services and support for redundant employees, reassigning
the remaining employees, and rebuilding experience among new work groups, have no impact on
TQM effort or managerial attention and resources for TQM. Such a perfect policy can never be
accomplished in reality. Nevertheless, the policy provides a benchmark to assess the potential
for policies that can reduce turmoil and low morale associated with downsizing.
Indeed, the 'wise layoff' policy mitigates the tradeoff (table 7; figure 8). Employment
falls by about the same amount as in the base case, but because, by assumption, commitment to
TQM remains high, there is further quality improvement, leading to higher operating profits by
1991. Higher profits lead to higher stock prices, reducing the threat of a takeover. By 1993 the
policy produces large benefits, outperforming the no-layoff case. Without the short-term penal-
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ties caused by the no-layoff policy, the wise-layoff policy leads to even higher levels of com-
mitment to TQM in both manufacturing and product development, and thus higher quality,
revenues, profit, and share price. Note that because TQM has led to even greater improvement
compared to the base case, simulated 1993 employment is 13% less than the base case despite a
13% increase in sales.
The results show large benefits accruing from efforts to maintain employee morale and
moderate the disruption caused by downsizing and reorganization. However, even in the wise
layoff case the company experiences severe financial stress. Despite the wise layoff policy,
operating profit, share price, and market value relative to cash flow all fall substantially between
1989 and 1991, forcing Analog to lay off a significant number of employees. While human
resource policies addressing employment security and morale speed Analog's recovery from the
crisis, even perfect management of human resources does not prevent it.
6.4 Maintaining Operating Margins
Analog's dilemma arose from the rapid improvement they achieved in the manufacturing
operation compared to the slow pace of improvement in activities that can generate new demand,
including identifying new market opportunities, assessing customer needs, developing new prod-
ucts, and improving distribution channels. Progress was unbalanced because improvement half-
lives in most manufacturing operations are shorter than in activities such as product develop-
ment, marketing, distribution, and management, due to their greater technical and organizational
complexity. Further, management believed early results were needed to bootstrap commitment
to TQM, and allocated support resources preferentially towards those areas showing the most
improvement. The preference for rapid results led to even faster progress in manufacturing and
even less support for improvements in product development, sales, and administration.
Unbalanced improvement caused two critical side effects. First, excess capacity arose
because capacity grew faster than demand. Second, direct costs per unit (driven by progress in
manufacturing operations) fell faster than indirect costs per unit (driven by progress in R&D,
sales, administration and other overhead functions). Price-setting, however, ntinued to reflect
the traditional cost structure, leading to a significant erosion of operating profit as indirect costs,
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though falling, became a larger share of unit costs.
Suppose Analog had understood the impact of differential improvement rates and ad-
justed its pricing policy to maintain profit margins as the cost structure changed. Table 5 shows
that to maintain the 1985 ratio of operating income to sales (on a per unit basis), prices in 1989
should have been about 5% higher than the historical 1989 value. We thus test a policy in which
the target markup ratio rises 5% between 1988 and 1989. Prices still fall, though more slowly, to
compensate for the slower rate of improvement in indirect costs compared to direct costs.
The policy leads to superior performance (table 8, figure 9). As shown in table 8, the
higher price policy has no effect on revenues in 1991 compared to the base case, but operating
profits and share price rise by about 20%. By 1993 the higher margin policy yields a small
increase in revenue and boosts operating profit and the stock price by almost fifty percent
compared to the base case.
Significantly, the higher margin policy is effective even though we assume the long-run
elasticity of demand with respect to price is greater than unity. Several forces are responsible:
First, though the long-run price elasticity of demand is high, revenues don't drop in the
short run because customers are locked in to existing contracts, and require time to redesign their
own products to use competitor chips. The lock-in effect is modest, however, as we assume only
a nine month lag in the adjustment of market share to changes in price.
Second, competitors respond to Analog's pricing. Competitors are assumed to pursue an
aggressive price policy, pricing their own products at the lesser of a fraction of Analog's own
price or the level that provides normal profits given their unit costs. Under the higher margin
policy, Analog's prices fall more slowly, causing the competitors to lower their own prices more
slowly as well, leaving relative attractiveness nearly unchanged. However, the effect of competi-
tor accommodation is short-lived. By the middle of 1989 the competitors' own improvement
efforts have reduced their costs enough for them to lower prices below the traditional ratio to
Analog. After this point, competitors price as low as possible regardless of Analog's price.
Third, because higher margins improve revenues and operating profit, the share price
does not fall as much as the base case. The improvement in financial results delays and reduces
the magnitude of layoffs, leading to higher commitment to TQM and thus higher quality. By
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1991 the higher margin policy produces higher yield, lower defects and cycle time, and improved
delivery performance compared to the base case. Thus even though higher prices make Analog's
products less attractive, the other attributes of product attractiveness rise above base case levels,
partially offsetting the effect of higher prices.
Fourth, the increase in revenue caused by higher margins leads to higher R&D spending
and thus a greater number of new products. As the number of new products grows, total demand
increases, offsetting the reduction in market share caused by higher prices. Due to the long
product development time the effect is a modest 1% increase in the number of breakthrough
products on the market by 1991. However, the effect is cumulative because of the positive
feedback of higher sales, greater R&D spending, more new products, and still higher sales. By
1993 the product portfolio has grown 2% larger than the base case. The impact on sales is even
greater since the new products, in the early stages of their lifecycle, boost demand growth.
Fifth, higher demand increases capacity utilization compared to the base case. Higher
utilization means unit costs fall below base case levels, since total costs are apportioned over a
larger volume. Thus while the markup ratio rises by 5% under the policy, prices do not rise as
much. By mid 1989, before the incremental new product development has had any impact,
Analog's simulated price has risen 5% compared to the base case. By 1993, greater quality and
especially the introduction of additional new products boost volume and lower unit costs com-
pared to the base case so that Analog's price rises only 2% above the base case. Thus the
cumulative effects of higher margins on volume and quality feed back to reduce the price differ-
ential and improve Analog's competitiveness even as Analog maintains a higher profit margin.
The benefits of the higher margin policy illustrate the complexity of the feedback
processes governing the dynamics Analog experienced. Since we assume demand is more than
unit elastic, higher margins would reduce revenues and hurt the firm if all else remained
constant. But because the higher margin policy leads to higher quality, additional product
development, higher volumes, and lower unit costs, revenues and profitability increase.
The results of the higher margin policy are contingent on a variety of assumptions,
particularly customer preferences and competitor behavior. Sensitivity analysis shows the bene-
fits of the higher margin policy fall as the elasticity of product attractiveness to price increases,
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as the lag in the response of customers to price changes shortens, and as the competitors' ability
to cut costs improves. We assume price is the most important attribute of attractiveness, with a
price elasticity of attractiveness of -3. Increasing the elasticity of product attractiveness with
respect to price to -4 reduces the benefits of the policy, though it still dominates the base case.
When the sensitivity of attractiveness to price rises to -5, the higher margin policy has a net
negative effect on Analog. On the other hand, to the extent competitors follow Analog's lead in
pricing rather than aggressively cutting price as their own costs fall, the benefits of higher mar-
gins would be even greater. Likewise, the higher margin policy will be more beneficial to the
extent Analog can speed new products to market, increase the quality of their products, or lock
customers in to its own products by offering new products not yet cloned by the competition.
7. Discussion
Quality advocates argue that successful improvement programs lead to competitive
advantage and superior financial results. Analog's TQM experience appears paradoxical because
significant improvements in quality were followed by deterioration in financial results. The
resolution of the paradox is the recognition that the link between successful improvement and
financial results is much more complex. Improvement programs are tightly coupled with the
other activities of the firm, along with its customers, competitors, and the financial markets.
A core result of the model is the unbalanced impact of improvement activity on different
parts of the organization. Processes with low technical and organizational complexity will
improve most rapidly. The processes with lowest complexity and the fastest improvement rates
tend to be capacity augmenting, while demand-generating activities like new product
development, customer needs assessment, and reorientation of product mix and distribution
strategy have the highest complexity and the slowest improvement rates. The throughput of a
machine on the factory floor can be improved quickly: the laws of physics governing the process
are well understood; the improvement team consists of the operators and others from the plant;
experiments can be designed and carried out rapidly; confounding variables can be kept to a
minimum. In contrast, demand-generating activities such as learning to assess the voice of the
customer, developing new products faster and more effectively, allocating resources among
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divisions, and forging customer alliances require the participation of top management along with
people from multiple divisions, functions, disciplinary backgrounds, and other firms. The 'laws'
governing these processes are much less obvious than the laws of physics, and the tools available
to improve them less highly developed. It takes longer to design and carry out experiments, and
during this time changes in the environment confound the interpretation of results. Thus
improvement programs are likely to increase capacity faster than demand, and will lower unit
production costs faster than unit indirect costs.
A simple calculation reveals how fast productivity can grow before creating excess
capacity. The labor requirements of any firm are gi. :: by sales divided by labor productivity.
The fractional rate of change of labor requirements, -, is thus determined by the fractional
growth in sales, s, less the fractional rate of productivity growth, p:
1* =s-p (11)
Denoting the magnitude of the fractional attrition rate from the labor force as a, the maximum
rate of productivity growth consistent with a no-layoff policy is thus:
p < s+a (12)
Thus the more successfully an organization improves its manufacturing operations, the more
intense the tradeoff will be. From its founding through 1985, Analog's sales growth averaged
27% per year. Throughout much of this period the New England economy was booming, and
turnover was high - a senior human resources manager estimated it to be 10 - 20% per year - as
employees readily found new opportunities in the vigorous electronics industry. During the
boom, productivity growth of 40 to 50% per year could have been accommodated by sales
growth and normal attrition. However, as growth faltered and unemployment rose, voluntary
quits shrank to less than 5% per year. With negligible attrition and sales growth less than
10%/year, even small rates of improvement necessarily led to excess employment.
The confluence of weak economy, low attrition, and TQM is not coincidental. Many
companies implement quality programs in reaction to the competitive pressures caused by slow
demand growth. A weak economy suppresses voluntary turnover. TQM has become popular in
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the US precisely when firms are least able to absorb productivity gains without layoffs.
The analysis above applies not just to TQM but to any improvement techniques, such as
business process re-engineering, that depends for its success on the efforts or cooperation of the
employees. The faster productivity rises - regardless of how the gains are achieved - the greater
the risk of excess capacity. The dilemma has not received sufficient attention in the human
resources literature. For example, Bluestone and Bluestone (1992) suggest firms create
commitment to programs like TQM by guaranteeing job security if the workers can boost
productivity by, they suggest, 6%/year. In mature industries, or industries suffering from the
global recession where sales growth is substantially less than 6%/year, the productivity
improvement can only be absorbed if attrition is high or if market share can be increased at the
expense of competitors. Obviously, competitors will not accept such losses meekly, raising the
specter of price cuts that can undermine profits and force the firm into downsizing.
At Analog the dilemma was acute. Analog's history of growth and employment security
meant the first layoff would have enormous symbolic impact. Yet in a stagnant economy there
would be strong pressure for layoffs if TQM improved manufacturing before faster and better
product development could build new markets. The other horn of the dilemma was equally
sharp. Analog could not afford to delay implementing TQM. Analog's customers were demand-
ing higher performance from their suppliers, and competition was intensifying. As the simula-
tions show, failure to improve would have threatened Analog's industry leadership and, perhaps,
its very survival.
Analog faced a strong tradeoff between the short and long run impacts of TQM.
Maintaining commitment to TQM by guaranteeing job security does benefit the firm in the long
run as higher commitment leads to higher quality and greater success in the marketplace.
However, maintaining employment worsens the already severe financial stress Analog
experienced. Analog's vulnerability to hostile takeover would have increased. But in the long
run, financial results are superior, downsizing pressures subside and commitment to continuous
improvement is higher. To the extent management can work with the employees to reduce the
fear of job losses the tradeoff can be mitigated.
The interaction of TQM with pricing policy compounded Analog's difficulties. Given
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the traditional markup, the faster manufacturing improved, the greater the disparity between
direct and indirect costs, and the larger the resulting reduction in profits. Lower profits then feed
back to intensify the need for layoffs, divert managerial attention from TQM to financial fire-
fighting, and trigger the collapse of commitment to TQM, with resulting backsliding of quality,
loss of market share, and pressure to cut prices further.
The core of the dilemma is the belief that people will not participate in new programs like
TQM unless they can see the benefits right away. On the one hand, academics and practitioners
assert that "successful change programs begin with results" (Schaffer and Thomson 1990). Early
results are widely advocated to overcome the "prove it to me" attitude by demonstrating the
validity of the program, kick-start diffusion and boost the virtuous cycle of commitment and
effort (Shiba, Walden and Graham 1993). On the other hand, a focus on quick results biases
decisions against innovations with long time delays and leads to myopic resource allocation. The
side effects of such policies may feed back to undermine the program in the long term. Areas
where improvement is fastest tend to augment capacity. Demand-generating activities such as
product development and customer partnerships are intrinsically complex and can not yield
results as quickly. A focus on early results may lead to excess capacity, financial stress, down-
sizing, low morale, and the collapse of commitment to the program. Improvement programs can
fail not in spite, but precisely because of their early success.
8. Implications and further research
TQM represents a significant advance in tools for organizational learning and improve-
ment. The success of TQM in improving operations stems from the focus on continuous
improvement and workforce participation. These are formidable benefits. Yet TQM is also
limited. Specifically, TQM relies on tools and processes that assume the separability of causes in
the system under study. TQM as currently practiced assumes a quality improvement team can
rank the causes of defects for a given process and address them sequentially. TQM tools such as
Pareto charts and Ishikawa diagrams produce lists of causes of different defects. l l1 Efforts to
improve different processes often progress independently of one another - a plant might have
dozens of different improvement teams operating simultaneously. TQM grows out of the belief
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that the world can be decomposed into independent causes generating independent effects.
Decomposition is a time-honored problem solving strategy (Simon 1969). It often works
effectively, provided the process under consideration is not strongly coupled to other systems in
the environment. When couplings are strong, however, decomposition may lead to ineffective
policies. Worse, piecemeal policies may intensify the problem (Forrester 1971, Meadows 1982,
Ackoff 1978, 1981), or even lead to catastrophe (Perrow 1984). Decomposition methods ignore
feedback processes and interactions, and discount time delays and side effects. Decomposition
in complex, tightly coupled dynamic systems optimizes the parts at the expense of the whole and
the present at the expense of the future.
While many couplings on the factory floor, where TQM evolved, are weak, couplings at
the upper management level are strong. Customer needs assessment, product development,
strategic planning, organization design, and resource allocation involve high technical and
organizational complexity. For example, a product development team is tightly coupled with
other functions within the firm (process engineering, marketing, finance, etc.) and with many
organizations outside the firm (customers, vendors, competitors, etc.). Experiments to evaluate
different ways to translate customer requirements into product specifications take months to
carry out, and face many confounding variables (see Burchill 1993 for a compelling example).
Available TQM tools can not lead to rapid improvement when couplings are tight, time delays
are long, and feedback is ambiguous. Tools and processes to help redesign complex activities
like product development are less mature than the TQM methods that proved so effective on the
factory floor. Stata commented "The thing that hung us up for the longest time in the product
development [PD] area is that we didn't have anybody in the company who had a clue as to how
to improve PD. It wasn't that we didn't think it was important, but how do you do it?"
The next generation of TQM tools should incorporate an explicit feedback view of the
firm and its environment. The tools should help managers understand the long-term, organiza-
tion-wide consequences of their actions. Since ADI's initial efforts, several techniques have
been proposed to address these problems. These include concept engineering (Burchill 1993),
quality function deployment (Hauser and Clausing 1988), Hoshin planning (Shiba, Walden and
Graham 1993), soft systems methods such as cognitive mapping (Checkland 1981, Eden, Jones,
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and Sims 1983, Wolstenholme 1990), and simulation and gaming (Carroll, Marcus and Sterman
1993, de Geus 1988, Morecroft 1988, Morecroft and Sterman 1992, Senge and Sterman 1991).
Further research and field tests are needed to assess the effectiveness of these tools.
Analog had all the information needed to anticipate the dynamics of TQM described here.
Their own data suggested improvement half-lives of less than a year in capacity-augmenting
activities like yield, defects and cycle time and longer than three years in demand-generating
activities like product development (recall figure 1 and table 1). While uncertainties would obvi-
ously be greater ex ante, the results depend on fundamental structural features that are not in
doubt: manufacturing improves faster than product development; direct costs fall faster than
indirect costs; success generates enthusiasm and leads to further effort; competitors do not stand
still. What Analog lacked was a framework enabling them to understand the implications of their
knowledge. Stata reflected "We didn't have a deep enough appreciation for the complexity we
faced in our systems. Typical managers today are just not skilled at that, even high up."
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Notes
1 A more detailed description of Analog and its TQM experience is found in Kaplan 1990a and 1990b.
2 The half-life satisfies .5(Dt0 -Dmin)/(Dt0 -Dmin)= exp(-pth ).
3 The scorecard evolved over time as better metrics were identified.
4 Schneiderman left Analog at the end of 1992 and became an independent consultant.
5 The model is a large system of coupled nonlinear differential equations. Complete documentation is available
from the authors.
6 The economic growth index was not significant, apparently because the variance in annual demand growth is not
great enough to estimate the relationship. Alternatively the index of electronic components may be too crude a
proxy of demand. Nevertheless, since the macroeconomy must influence the demand for ADI's products, we retain
ge in the model with an income elasticity of unity, which is not significantly different from the estimated value.
7 In 1991 ADI acquired one of its competitors, PMI. The acquisition is not incorporated in the model, so
comparisons after 1991 are not meaningful.
8 Actually these activities took time and were distributed over a several month period. The assumed starting time
represents a good midpoint for the startup process.
9 In reality the strength of the sole-source effect is mediated by quality. When quality is low, customers will be
reluctant to depend on a small number of suppliers. When delivery reliability and quality are high, however,
customers may prefer to reduce the number of suppliers. Many TQM advocates call for vendor partnering to involve
suppliers in the improvement process.
10 It might be argued that the decline in prices was due entirely to market pressures outside of Analog's control. If
so, the drop in profits was not a side effect of TQM but the inevitable result of increased competition. Clearly
competition has intensified. Historically few substitutes were available for Analog's mostly proprietary products.
Beginning in the mid 1980s, competitors began to produce 'pin compatible' substitutes offering identical
functionality. ADI's business also began to shift away from defense-related applications towards markets such as
consumer electronics where competition is more intense and margins are lower. If ADI used markup pricing
exclusively and ignored competitive pressures entirely, the 15.8% decline in unit production costs from 1985 to
1989 would yield the same fractional reduction in average selling prices. Average selling prices actually fell 17.2%,
an additional drop of 1.4 percentage points, implying intensifying competition and shifting product mix caused
prices to fall 9% beyond the decline in unit costs. If average prices had fallen only as much as unit costs, operating
income per unit would still have fallen 35% because of the smaller drop in indirect costs per unit.
11 More sophisticated tools for improvement such as Taguchi and other experimental design techniques can
accommodate nonlinearities and interactions. However, we are not aware of any applications of these design
methods to managerial processes.
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Table 1. Analog Devices' Actual and Target Quality Measures, 1987 (Stata 1989)
1987 Half-life 1992(actual) (months) (target)
External Measures
On time delivery 85% 9 >99.8%
Outgoing defect level 500 PPM 9 <10 PPM
Delivery Lead time 10 weeks 9 < 3 weeks
Internal Measures
Manufacturing cycle time 15 weeks 9 4-5 weeks
Process Defect Level 5000 PPM 6 <10 PPM
Yield 20% 9 >50%
New Product Time to market 36 months 24 6 months
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Table 2. The balanced scorecard (adapted from version in Kaplan 1990a).
Division
Financial
Revenue
Revenue Growth
Profit
ROA
QIP
On Time Delivery
% CRDs not Matched
Excess Leadtime
Labor Turnover
Manufacturing Metrics
Outgoing Defects (PPM)
Process Defects (PPM)
Cycle Time
Yield
New Products
Bookings
New Product Introductions
Product Development Time
Note: QIP = Quality Improvement Processes; CRD = Customer Requested Delivery Dates.
-
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Table 3 Model boundary, highlighting the main endogenous variables.
Endoaenous Exoaenous Excluded
Physical:
Orders
Shipments
Production
Wafer Starts
Finished inventory
WIP
Materials Inventory
Capital stock
Labor force
Development engineers
Industrial Production Index
for Electronic Components
Return on the Standard & Poor's
500 (stock market yield)
Index of industry best practice for
TQM
Wage and Price deflators
Financial
Sales
COGS
Gross profit
Operating expense
R&D, GSA expenses
Depreciation
Operating income
Net income
Share price
Managerial Accounting
Labor, capital, & materials,
efficiency and volume variances
Overhead, OH burden rate
Overhead absorption
variances
Quality Metrics
Semiconductor yield
Defective products shipped (PPM)
Delivery Time
On time delivery percentage
Manufacturing cycle time
Product development time
New product introduction rate
Motivational variables
Management commitment to TQM
Workforce commitment to TQM
Workforce perception of job security
TQM support resources
Managerial attention to TQM
Financial stress (pressure for layoffs)
Fraction of support to mfg. vs.
product development
Industry and Competitive Variables
Competitor price, quality measures
Analog price
Industry demand
Analog market share
Acquisitions
Patent expiration
Financing strategy
Massachusetts economy(e.g. labor attrition rates)
Changing customer mix(e.g. less dependence on
gov't contracts)
11
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Table 4 Historical fit of model, 1985 - 1991.
Variable MAPE
Unit Sales
Bias
.04
Sales Revenue .03
.03
.00
Theil Inequality Statistics
Unequal Unequal
Variation Covariation
.02
.05
.95
.94
N
6.95
.92 24
Cost of Goods Sold .05 .06 .08 .86 .91 24
Operating Income .22 .04 .34 .61 .69 24
R & D Budget .07 .09 .01 .90 .89 24
Cum. Products Introduced .04 .00 .53 .47 .99 24
Manufacturing Yield .10 .17 .00 .82 .79 72
Outgoing Defects .20 .03 .02 .95 .93 24
Mfg. Cycle Time .11 .10 .03 .87 .86 24
On Time Delivery .05 .30 .06 .64 .77 24
Market Value/Cash Flow .17 .00 .15 .85 .79 6
Share Price. .12 .10 .04 .86 .81 24
Note: MAPE = Mean Absolute Percent Error between simulated and actual variables. Bias, Unequal
Variation, and Unequal Covariation are the Theil Inequality Statistics showing what fraction of the mean
square error between simulated and actual series is due to unequal means, unequal variances, and
imperfect correlation, respectively. Low bias and unequal variation fractions indicate the error is
unsystematic. N is the number of data points in the historical series. Theil statistics may not add to 1.00
due to rounding.
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Table 5. Changes in cost structure caused by TQM interacted with pricing policy to yield lower profit.
Historical Data
$/unit 1985 1989 % A
Ave. Selling Price 16.32 13.51 -17.2
- Cost of Goods Sold 7.61 6.41 -15.8
= Gross Profit 8.71 7.10 -18.5
- Indirect Costs 6.35 5.80 -8.7
= Operating Income 2.36 1.30 -44.7
Markup Ratio (%)
= 100*(ASP/COGS) 214 211 -1.7
All figures expressed per unit sold. %A column shows the change as a percent of the 1985 value.
Source: Sales Revenue, COGS (Cost of Goods Sold), and Operating Expense Data from 1987 and 1989
Annual Reports. Unit Sales Data provided by ADI. Indirect costs include General, Sales, Marketing,
R&D, and Administrative expenses.
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Table 6. Policy Analysis: No-Layoff policy vs. Base Case.
1991 1993
Variable Base Case No-Layoff %A Base Case No-Layoff %A
Revenue ($ Million/qtr) 111 113 2 121 133 10
Operating Income ($ Million/qtr) 5.7 5.0 -12 8.0 10.7 34
R & D Expenditure ($ Million/qtr) 17.4 17.6 1 18.2 19.6 8
Work Force in Mfg (people) 1434 2231 56 1369 1871 37
Comm to TQM in Mfg (dimensionless) 0.01 0.57 0.56 * 0.34 0.79 0.45 *
Comm to TQM in PD (dimensionless) 0.37 0.25 -0.12 * 0.88 0.72 -0.16 *
Breatkthrough Products on the Market 284 283 0 331 335 1
Manufacturing Yield (%) 0.40 0.42 5 0.37 0.44 19
Outgoing Defects (PPM) 268 195 -27 399 190 -52
Mfg Cycle Time (months) 2.17 1.94 -11 2.57 1.94 -25
OTD (dimensionless) 0.93 0.96 3 0.89 0.96 8
Product Dev. Time (months) 25.4 25.5 1 22.7 23.1 2
Stock Price ($/share) 8.22 7.50 -9 11.88 14.67 23
* The values in the '%A' column for Commitment to TQM in Manufacturing and Product development are
absolute differences.
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Table 7. Policy Analysis: Wise Layoffs vs. Base Case.
1991 1993
Variable Base Case Wise Layoffs %A Base Case Wise Layoffs %A
Revenue ($ Million/qtr) 111 113 2 121 137 13
Operating Income ($ Million/qtr) 5.7 7.3 28 8.0 13.8 73
R & D Expenditure ($ Million/qtr) 17.4 17.5 1 18.2 20 10
Work Force in Mfg (people) 1434 1437 0 1369 1197 -13
Comm to TQM in Mfg (dimensionless) 0.01 0.61 0.60 * 0.34 0.89 0.55 *
Comm to TQM in PD (dimensionless) 0.37 0.30 -0.07 * 0.88 0.84 -0.04 *
Breatkthrough Products on the Markel 284 285 0 331 337 2
Manufacturing Yield (%) 0.40 0.42 5 0.37 0.45 22
Outgoing Defects (PPM) 268 193 -28 399 177 -56
Mfg Cycle Time (months) 2.17 1.96 -10 2.57 1.88 -27
OTD (dimensionless) 0.93 0.96 3 0.89 0.96 8
Product Dev. Time (months) 25.4 25.5 1 22.7 22.3 -2
Stock Price ($/share) 8.22 9.25 13 11.88 20.52 73
* The values in the '%A' column for Commitment to TQM in Manufacturing and Product development are
absolute differences.
For the Wise Layoff policy the function fs{s} is set identically to zero (see eq. 10), so that layoffs have
no impact on commitment to TQM.
III
D-4390
Table 8. Policy Analysis: 5% Increase in target margin phased in from 1988-1989.
1991 1993
Variable Base Case +5% Margin %A Base Case +5% Margin %A
Revenue ($ Million/qtr) 111 111 0 121 124 2
Operating Income ($ Million/qtr) 5.7 6.9 21 8.0 11.4 43
R & D Expenditure ($ Million/qtr) 17.4 17.5 1 18.2 18.5 2
Work Force in Mfg (people) 1434 1428 0 1369 1303 -5
Comm to TQM in Mfg (dimensionless) 0.01 0.02 0.01 * 0.34 0.48 0.14 *
Comm to TQM in PD (dimensionless) 0.37 0.35 -0.02 * 0.88 0.91 0.03 *
Breatkthrough Products on the Market 284 287 1 331 336 2
Manufacturing Yield (%) 0.40 0.41 2 0.37 0.39 5
Outgoing Defects (PPM) 268 246 -8 399 340 -15
Mfg Cycle Time (months) 2.17 2.10 -3 2.57 2.42 -6
OTD (dimensionless) 0.93 0.94 1 0.89 0.92 3
Product Dev. Time (months) 25.4 25.3 0 22.7 22.3 -2
Stock Price ($/share) 8.22 9.76 19 11.88 17.65 49
* The values in the '%A' column for Commitment to TQM in Manufacturing and Product development are
absolute differences.
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Figure 1. Dependence of improvement half lives on technical and organizational complexity. Adapted from
Schneiderman (1991).
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Figure 2. Overview of Model Structure
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Figure 3. Dependence of Sales Growth on Product Age.
0)0
CuCn
0 
cu
m
U.
3
2
I-
I-
%-1
1
0
-1
0 20 40 60
Product Age (quarters)
Model: gi,A,t = a + (Ai,t)Y + get + Et
Estimated Coefficient
-.465
6.413
-.743
.052
Asymptotic Standard. Error
.178
.407
.088
.914
80
Parameter
a
¥
8
2 .51, N = 270.
III
48
D-4390
Figure 4. Comparison of simulated and actual data: Sales and Financial metrics
I . I
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Note: The last data points show the impact of the PMI acquisition, raising Analog's sales, revenues, and
COGS above the simulated levels for 1991 because the acquisition is excluded from the model.
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Figure 4 (continued). Comparison of simulated and actual data: Sales and Financial metrics
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Figure 4 (continued). Comparison of simulated and actual data: Sales and Financial metrics
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Figure 5. Comparison of simulated and actual data: Quality metrics
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Figure 6a. Base Case: Fraction of workforce committed to TQM.
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Figure 6b. Base Case: Perceived Job Security (0 = no security; 1 = no layoffs believed possible)
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Figure 6c. Base Case: Adequacy of resources to support the TQM program.
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Figure 6d. Base Case: Fraction of TQM support resources allocated to manufacturing.
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Figure 6e. Base Case: Reported and Target Product Development Time
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Figure 6f. Base Case: ADI Market Share.
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Figure 7a. No-TQM Case: Revenue.
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Figure 7b. No-TOM Case: Operating income.
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Figure 7c. No-TOM Case: Share price
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Figure 8. A no-layoff policy causes a Long-term/Short-term tradeoff in financial results.
The 'Wise Layoff' policy, where job cuts have no impact on morale or TQM effort, moderates the tradeoff.
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Figure 9. Raising markups to compensate for the slower reduction in indirect costs
improves financial performance.
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